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Abstract. The last financial crisis has led to the greatest contribution of public funds ever 
made to Spanish banks. This paper studies why the need for support has been asymmet-
ric, with not all of the institutions requiring aid. Based on profitability of assets (ROA), 
we determine using panel data econometric and logit response models the components 
of profit and loss accounts that generated profitability as well as the factors leading to 
some entities to ask for aid. The analyses show that before the beginning of the crisis 
there were significant differences between entities that needed aid and those that did not. 
The most profitable banks grounded their success in the traditional revenue components 
of financial institutions (such as margin on interest rates and commissions), as well as 
in revenues obtained from participated companies and extraordinary results. The model 
offers a tool to detect entities in difficulties in advance, reducing the financial and social 
costs of public interventions. The factors more impacting on profitability of Spanish in-
stitutions are also identified.
Keywords: Spanish financial system, public aid, ROA, profitability, crisis, panel data.
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G34.
Introduction
Spain is currently carrying out its largest financial restructuring ever made to date. 
This restructuring has reduced significantly the number of financial institutions and 
has changed the Spanish financial map. A number of banks have disappeared and out 
of the 46 savings banks1 existing in 2009, only two of them, the smallest ones, remain 
1 Savings banks are special financial institutions. Compared to commercial banks, (i) their benefits 
cannot be distributed among their owners, they must be destined either to increase reserves or to 
their non-profit organizations, and (ii) their boards are chosen (in a high politicized environment) 
for regional and local political governments, account holders, employees and founders. Despite the 
above features, they can perform the same operations that commercial banks do, currently sharing 
the same public targets.
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(see Table 1). The rest of savings banks have been transformed into banks and half of 
them after either receiving some financial aid, being absorbed or being nationalized. 
The other half has transformed their management bodies, adopting the structure of 
a corporation, although most of them maintaining their brands to retain their market 
value. In any case, savings banks have stopped providing services that were previously 
available and this is far from a small matter as savings banks had 50% of the Spanish 
financial market share in 2009.
The injection of public capital has already been substantial; more than 25,500 million 
euros have been directly injected by Spanish public institutions – 19,369 million euros 
from the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FORB) and 6,202 million by the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund (DGF) – and, what’s more, the European Central Bank is committed 
to providing up to 100,000 million euros, of which 36,968 million has already been 
provided, to cover possible future needs (IMF 2012). In summary, a total of 62,539 
million euros (~6% of Spanish GDP) has already been injected and virtually all these 
aids have been for savings banks. 
The causes of this different behaviour between Spanish banks and savings banks have 
been a matter of study in the literature from different perspectives. For instance, after 
increasing politicization following law 44/2002, Azofra and Santamaria (2004) evaluate 
differences in efficiency in 2003; while for the current crisis Climent-Serrano (2012) 
examines profitability issues and Pérez-Ruiz (2012) focuses on corporate social respon-
sibility. The aim of this paper is to expand the analyses studying based on profit and 
loss accounts the determinants of return on assets for the years immediately preceding 
the crisis. In this study, however, the focus will not be on the structure of governance 
and property since it is possible to find successes and failures inside both groups. We 
check if the characteristics of the entities that have needed aid are different from those 
not requiring it. The goal is identifying some precursors or leading indicators that can 
help in the future to anticipate problems, making it easier to react to the financial su-
pervisory authority.
To guarantee the homogeneity of the period of analysis, our inquiry will focus on the 
profitability of the financial institutions from 2004 (when all financial institutions grew 
at a significant level) until 2009, when the symptoms of the current crisis in Spanish 
institutions started to appear. We fix the end of the period of analysis in 2009 because it 
was the year when most of the imbalances, gestated during the previous lustrum, began 
to blow up and the last year in which all the analysed entities (see Table 1) could present 
individual accounts. The merger and acquisition process started in 2010.
The feature of studying the profitability of Spanish institutions in the current crisis is not 
new and has already attracted scholars’ interest. In particular, Maudos (2012) compares 
the development of profitability in Spanish and European banks taking as reference the 
period 2007–2010. Besides the period of analysis, this study presents two additional 
substantive differences with Maudos’s work. Firstly, we focus on the factors that have 
determined profitability, distinguishing between entities who have received public aid 
and those that have not. And, secondly, although using exclusively Spanish data, our 
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results will be re-examined comparing data from the two groups. In this way, we will 
be able to identify the differences that first led some Spanish financial institutions to 
ask for help.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly summarizes banking 
profitability literature. Section 2 relates to the process that led to the restructuring of 
the Spanish financial system and resumes the route followed by financial institutions. 
Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the results 
of panel data econometric and logit regression analyses. Section 5 studies the differ-
ences between both groups of entities, focusing on the components that determined 
profitability. Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper.
1. Brief review of profitability literature
Besides the already cited works, profitability and related topics have been a matter of 
study in a large number of papers in Spain and around the world. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) analysed the determinants of the loan crisis in the Spanish financial system for 
the period 1985–1997 and found credit expansion, bank size, core capital ratio and 
business cycle as the variables that provoked the problems with loans and profitability. 
Interestingly, they also found out that these variables differently affected banks and sav-
ings banks – as Climent-Serrano and Pavía (2014a) do for the current crisis. In the same 
line, Miller and Noulas (1997) also pointed to declining quality of the loan portfolio as 
the main factor affecting US large commercial banks profitability during the latter part 
of the 1980s. Hayden et al. (2007) claimed, after studying profitability in 983 German 
banks for the period 1996–2002, that diversification does not help profitability.
Liua and Wilson (2010) analysed the determinants of the profitability in Japanese banks 
between 2000 and 2007 using panel data and pointed out capital ratio, assumed risks 
and efficiency as significant determinants among internal variables, and stock market de-
velopment, industry concentration and GDP as external determinants. Also using panel 
data and reviewing the determinants of profitability in 61 countries over the period 
1992–2006, Hsieh and Lee (2010) demonstrated that the level of banking competi-
tion is ambiguous for profitability. They emphasized that among the determinants of 
profitability are the market structure, the level of activity, the restrictions on banks to 
purchase securities in the insurance business and other non-banking businesses such 
as the restrictions to entry to foreign banks, the investor protection, the presence of a 
sound financial system and the per capita GDP. Similarly, Bolt et al. (2012) examined 
profitability in a sample of 17 OECD countries for the period 1979–2007 and obtained 
trajectories of interest margins, insolvency provisions and economic cycle as profitabil-
ity determinants. Finally, in a macro study of more than 15,000 banks in 148 countries, 
Shehzadab et al. (2013) study the interaction between size, growth and profitability and 
conclude that bank growth and profitability are independent of each other.
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2. Restructuring process and background
Initially, Spain looked not greatly affected by the crisis triggered by US subprime mort-
gages and related toxic products that erupted in the United States during the summer of 
2007. A crisis that, worsened by the failure of some US financial institutions (the most 
notorious case being the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 
2008), culminated in a sovereign debt crisis in the countries of the Eurozone from early 
2010 (Acharya et al. 2014; Acharya, Steffen 2015). In early 2009, however, the first 
symptoms of what would be the largest Spanish financial crisis ever began to appear 
with the intervention of the savings bank Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM) in March 
2009.
According to many scholars (Carbó, Maudos 2010; Foos et al. 2010; Berges et al. 2011; 
Maudos 2012), the main problem in Spain was the enormous amount of investment 
made by financial institutions and particularly savings banks in real estate and the losses 
caused after the bursting of the housing bubble. Additionally, other factors, both external 
and internal, worsened the situation of the Spanish financial system. Among the exter-
nal factors can be cited unemployment rates above 20% and an intense recession with 
continuing negative and negligible positive rates of growth; whereas the overcapacity 
caused by the excessive growth of the branch network of savings banks can be quoted 
as an internal factor. Further impact has also come from more expensive liabilities due 
to losses of income from investments in capital, holding companies, strategic invest-
ment, speculative investments and the de facto closure of the international wholesale 
money markets for Spanish banks. All these circumstances have significantly reduced 
the profitability and solvency of the Spanish financial institutions (Climent-Serrano, 
Pavía 2014b).
In this context and with the aim of dealing with the situation and putting some order 
in the process, the Spanish government created a public body (FORB) to drive the re-
structuring. Through this body, two different governments of Spain have issued in eight 
laws, delivered in just three years, the regulations that should govern the restructuring. 
These regulations address three general areas: (i) amending the corporate governance of 
savings banks; (ii) facilitating the flow of public funds to those entities needing aid, as 
long as they prove to be profitable and economically viable; and (iii) cleaning up from 
toxic assets the bank balances by demanding strong provisions to cover the impairment 
of real estate assets. This new legislation coupled with the successive deterioration of 
the economic situation and the new solvency regulations led to a progressive loss of the 
minimum solvency margin in some entities and to the need of intervention by Spanish 
political and financial authorities.
Table 1 shows a summary of the process of restructuring experienced by the Spanish 
financial system. In particular, the amounts of injected funds as grants and the type of 
restructuring undergone (either fusion, institutional protection system or nationalization) 
are displayed. As can be observed, final entities are obtained after several restructuring 
steps and after experiencing episodes of support of different types.
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3. Data and methodology
The research is based on the main Spanish financial institutions: a total of 43 savings 
banks (all except CCM and Cajasur which were intervened, receiving public aid, before 
2010) and the 14 largest commercial banks (see Table 1). This comprises 99% of the 
assets of Spanish banks and savings banks. The profit and loss accounts from years 2004 
to 2009 published in the annual account reports of these entities have been used as vari-
ables for the analysis. In particular, a panel database was created combining a (dummy) 
fictitious variable that captures if an entity has received some kind of assistance (either 
in the form of absorption or financial support) and all the components of profit and loss 
accounts of all these entities.
Table 1. Spanish bank system restructuring process up to December, 31st 2012*
Aid Lead S/B Former entity Type according and millions of aid Final entity
1 0 0 S Caja Madrid IPS
4,465
Bankia Nationalized
17,959
1
Bankia2 0 0 S Bancaja
3 0 0 S La Caja de Canarias
4 0 0 S Laietana
5 0 0 S Avila
6 0 0 S Segovia
7 0 0 S La Rioja
8 1 1 S La Caixa Merger by 
absorption
CaixaBank CaixaBank
(CaixaBank 
absorbs 
Banca Cívica 
and Banco de 
Valencia)
2
CaixaBank9 1 0 S Girona
10 0 0 S Navarra IPS
977
Banca 
Civica starts 
trading on 
stock market
11 0 0 S Caja Burgos
12 0 0 S Caja Canarias
13 0 0 S Caja Sol
14 0 0 S Guadalajara
15 0 0 B Valencia 4,500 Intervened
16 1 1 S Cajastur + CCM Cajastur SIP LiberBank 3
LiberBank17 1 1 S Extremadura
18 1 1 S Cantabria
19 1 1 S CAI Caja Tres
IPS
Banco 
Ibercaja 
(Fusion 
between 
Ibercaja and 
Caja Tres)
Banco 
Ibercaja
4
Banco 
Ibercaja
20 1 1 S Badajoz
21 1 1 S Circulo Burgos
22 1 1 S Ibercaja Banco 
Ibercaja
23 0 0 S Granada SIP
IPS
BMN, 
Banco Mare 
Nostrum
5
Banco 
Mare 
Nostrum
24 0 0 S Murcia
25 0 0 S Penades
26 0 0 S Sa Nostra
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Aid Lead S/B Former entity Type according and millions of aid Final entity
27 1 1 S BBK + Cajasur 
(392)**
IPS Banco Bilbao 
Bizkaia 
Kutxa
6
Banco 
Bilbao 
Bizkaia 
Kutxa
28 1 1 S Kutxa
29 1 1 S Vital Kutxa
30 1 1 S Unicaja Merger by 
absorption
Unicaja 
Banco
Unicaja 
Banco
(Unicaja 
absorbes 
Caja España)
7.
Unicaja 
Banco
31 1 0 S Jaen
32 0 0 S Caja Duero Fusion
525
Banco Ceiss
33 0 0 S Caja España
34 1 1 S Ontinyent Savings 
bank
8 
Ontinyent
35 1 1 S Pollensa Savings 
bank
9  
Pollensa
36 1 1 B BBVA BBVA
(Unim 
absorbed by 
BBVA)
10
BBVA37 0 0 S Sabadell Fusion
953 Banco Unim38 0 0 S Tarrasa
39 0 0 S Manlleu
40 0 0 S Catalunya Fusion
2,968 
Catalunya Caixa. Intervened
9,08441 0 0 S Tarragona
42 0 0 S Manresa
43 0 0 S Galicia Fusion
3,627
Novacaixagalicia. Intervened
5,42544 0 0 S Caixanova
45 0 0 B Gallego Intervened given it belongs to Nocaixagalicia group
46 1 1 B Sabadell Sabadell
(Sabadell absorbes 
Guipuzcoano)
Sabadell
(Sabadell 
absorbs 
CAM)
11
Sabadell47 1 0 B Guipuzcoano
48 0 0 S CAM 5,249 Intervened
49 1 1 B Bankinter 12 
Bankinter
50 0 1 B Popular Banco Popular absorbs Banco Pastor 
and increases capital by 2,500 millions
13  
Popular51 1 0 B Banco Pastor
52 1 1 B Santander Banesto, a bank already owned by 
Santander, is absorbed completely  
by its owner
14 
Santander53 1 0 B Banesto
54 1 1 B Barclays 15 
Barclays
55 1 1 B Deutsche Bank 16 
Deutsche 
Bank
56 1 1 B March 17 Banca 
March
57 1 1 B Pueyo 18 Pueyo
Notes: * ‘Aid’ column identifies those entities receiving financial support (0). ‘Lead’ column identifies 
the entities losing control after a merger (0). S/B column indicates if the corresponding former entity 
was a bank (B) or a savings bank (S). IPS refers to institutional protection system. The numbers un-
der “Type according and Millions of aid” accounts for the millions euros of aid received; ** Cajasur 
receives 392 million euros from FORB before being absorbed by BBK.
End of Table 1
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In addition to return on assets (ROA), the list of account variables handled has been: 
the spread between the interest revenue on assets and interest expense on liabilities as 
a proportion of average assets (Margin, also called the banker’s mark-up), the return 
on capital investment (Rcapit), the profitability on assets from participated companies 
(Rpart), the revenue net of commissions on assets (Comis), the gains on financial trans-
actions on assets (Ropfin), the results of operations for exchange differences on assets 
(Difcamb), the net results of non-financial activities on assets (OtResul), the personnel 
and administrative expenses on assets (EficienA), the depreciation of assets (Amort), 
the provisions for deteriorating of credit investments made on assets (DetInvCre), other 
provisions on assets (OProv), the taxes paid on assets (Impu) and the losses due to 
deterioration on other assets, plus the gains (losses) on disposal of assets not classified 
as current for sale, plus the negative difference in business combination, plus the gains 
(losses) on non-current assets for sale not classified as operations interrupted, plus in-
come from discontinued operations on assets (ResExtr). Finally, the dummy variable 
(Type) identifies the group to which an entity belongs to. Type has been constructed 
considering the aid events experienced up to December, 31 2012 and takes value 0 
when the corresponding entity either has received financial support or has been absorbed 
not assuming control after a merger; whilst, otherwise, it takes value 1 if either it has 
not received aid or it has been leader after merging. This dummy variable is obtained 
multiplying the variables ‘Aid’ and ‘Lead’ of Table 1. In a regression analysis, the sign 
of the coefficient of Type will determine if there are differences in profitability between 
both groups of entities after controlling for the rest of variables.
The panel dataset built has been intensively analysed: a panel data econometric analysis 
of regression, with ROA as dependent variable, has been carried out to ascertain the 
possible determinants of profitability; a logit regression analysis has been done to check 
the power of loss and profit accounts features to predict the entities that were going to 
or not going to receive aid; and a mean difference analysis in which the components that 
determined ROA are studied is performed to highlight the main discrepancies by group.
4. Econometric analyses
As stated in the introduction, the first aim of this paper is to determine the components 
of profit and loss accounts that generate profitability, distinguishing between entities 
who have received support from those that have not. The dataset consists of a sample of 
57 credit institutions for which 6 time periods have been observed, therefore a repeated 
cross-sectional time-series panel data is available. This provides us, compared to just 
cross-sectional databases, with a more informative database (with more variability, less 
collinearity and more degrees of freedom) that will permit us to attain more efficient 
estimates in an econometric linear regression model and mainly to control for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity. The existence of specific characteristics of the entities, αi, 
that cannot be measured nor observed but that affect profitability could entail the pos-
sible inefficiency or inconsistency of OLS estimates. A possible relationship of these 
individual effects, αi, with other explanatory variables could bias the estimates. With 
this issue in mind, the estimation techniques of panel data allows for this unobserved 
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heterogeneity to be controlled. Thus, along with the components of profit and loss ac-
counts (which do not show multicollinearity problems), we have considered that there 
are specific characteristics of each entity, constant over time but not measurable or 
observable affecting the relationship, αi. The fixed effects baseline model specified has 
been:
 ROAit = αi + β1Typeit+ β2Marginit + β3Rcapitit + β4Rpartit + β5Comisit + β6Ropfinit +
 β7Difcambit + β8OtResultit + β9EficienAit + β10AmortAit + β11OProvit + β12DeinvCrdit +
 β13ResExtrit + β14Impuit + ωit,
where subindex i denotes entity, t represents time, the β’s are the slopes of the model 
and ωit is a disturbance error term.
This baseline model allows us to obtain the average contribution of each variable in the 
two groups, but does not inform about a possible different impact of ROA determinants 
in each group. A significant variable in one group could become insignificant in the 
overall sample or in the other group. Hence, two more regressions models (one for each 
group) have been computed to assess the marginal impacts of the variables between 
groups and the overall sample. The dependent variable is ROA and the input variables 
are all the components of profit and loss accounts. In the baseline model Type, which 
accounts for if an entity has (or not) received aid, is also included. The estimation re-
sults of the three models are shown in Table 2, where standardized coefficients are also 
displayed. Standardized coefficients are directly comparable among them and inform 
about the amount of change, in standard deviations, that a standard deviation change in 
an input variable would provoke in the dependent variable.
The same variables are identified as significant in the three models. Irrespective of 
whether an entity received (or not) aid all of them share the same sources of profit-
ability. Their impacts, however, are not homogeneous between groups. Profitability on 
assets from participated companies (Rpart) reaches the highest standardized coefficient, 
with a value of 0.643 in the pooled database. The sign is positive, so the greater the 
results a (savings) bank gets from its investee companies, the greater its ROA. The 
results of financial operations (Ropfin) are also very important in determining profit-
ability with a positive and high standardized coefficient, which reached a value of 0.346 
in aided companies and 0.528 in unaided banks. The higher the income from financial 
transactions is, the greater the ROA. Further, not surprisingly, the difference between 
interest paid and received (Margin) and the commissions charged (Comis) also have a 
positive impact on ROA and some of the greater standardized coefficients. In the case 
of Margin it was 0.220 in unaided banks and 0.332 in aided ones, while in average the 
coefficient of Comis was 0.148.
A result that may appear as contradictory at first glance is the positive sign of Impu as it 
indicates that the higher the tax expenditure, the higher the ROA. However it becomes 
logical when taxes are viewed as a share of profits received by the state and not as 
an expense for the company. In this case the pooled standardized coefficient is 0.118. 
Another fundamental component is OtResult with a standardized coefficient of 0.109. 
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Table 2. Coefficient estimates of profitability determinants ^
Baseline model  
(pooled data) Unaided entities model Aided entities model Comparisons
§
Variables
Unstand-
ardized co-
efficients¨
Standardi-
zed coe-
fficients
Unstand-
ardized co-
efficients¨
Standardi-
zed coe-
fficients
Unstand-
ardized co-
efficients¨
Standardi-
zed coe-
fficients
1.v.2 1.v.3 2.v.3
Constant 0.132**
(0.065)
0.311***
(0.115)
0.203***
(0.071) *
Type 0.093***(0.028) 0.068
Margin 0.409***(0.043) 0.273
0.399***
(0.066) 0.220
0.244***
(0.061) 0.332 ** **
Rcapit –0.001(0.000) –0.021
–0.001
(0.001) –0.025
0.002
(0.002) 0.072
Rpart 1.043***(0.034) 0.643
0.960***
(0.038) 0.632
1.283***
(0.194) 0.327 *** ***
Comis 0.497***(0.088) 0.148
0.387**
(0.150)
0.092 0.400***(0.101) 0.237
Ropfin 0.763***(0.032) 0.482
0.905***
(0.040) 0.528
0.349***
(0.056)
0.346 *** *** ***
Difcamb –0.787(0.620) –0.031
–0.290
(0.748) –0.013
–1.210
(1.319) –0.053
OtResul 0.568***(0.110) 0.109
0.681***
(0.196) 0.088
0.353***
(0.121) 0.159 * **
EficienA –0.426***
(0.054)
–0.230 –0.477***(0.098) –0.184
–0.201***
(0.067) –0.261 ***
AmortaA –0.658**(0.233) –0.060
–0.793**
(0.381) –0.055
–0.981***
(0.282) –0.192
OProv –0.026(0.130) –0.004
0.198
(0.253)
0.032 –0.073(0.131) –0.028
DetInvCre -0.499***(0.066) -0.158
–0.448***
(0.112) –0.108
–0.282***
(0.079) –0.214 **
ResExtr 0.277***
(0.057)
0.095 0.314**
(0.155)
0.038 0.223***
(0.053)
0.221
Impu 0.561***(0.101) 0.118
0.366**
(0.162) 0.074
0.727***
(0.121) 0.369 **
R2: .903 Durbin-
Watson: 1.453
Adjusted R2: .899
Observations: 342 (N = 
57, T = )
R2: .956 Durbin-
Watson: 1.413
Adjusted R2: .952
Observations: 132 (N = 
22, T = 6)
R2: .612 Durbin-
Watson: 1.505
Adjusted R2: .526
Observations: 210 (N = 
35, T = 6)
Notes: ^ Calculations made using IBM SPSS, Release 19. Dependent variables: ROA; ¨ Standard 
errors in brackets; § Significant differences among the estimates coefficients of the three models; *, 
**, and *** denote significance at level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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The last component, with a positive relative impact on ROA formation is ResExtr with 
the lower positive standardized coefficient, 0.095.
On the other hand, as expected, the relative costs of administration and personnel (Efi-
cenA) impact negatively, with the greater negative effect (in absolute terms) on ROA. 
During this period it had a standardized coefficient of –0.261 in aided banks and not 
surprisingly its impact was lower in unaided banks, reaching up to –0.184. Furthermore, 
DetinvCre and AmortA also had a significant negative impact on ROA with standardized 
coefficients, –0.158 and –0.060 respectively.
In light of above results, we ask ourselves if there are some configurations that char-
acterize the elements of each group and can serve to anticipate somehow the posterior 
state of affairs. Thus, to complement the panel data analyses, next we study through a 
logit regression to what extent ROA and all the profit and loss account variables could 
serve to separate the sample of (savings) banks into the two groups defined by Type.
The results of the predictions obtained after fitting a logit regression model to the full 
sample thought of as a pooled dataset are displayed in Table 3. Using a binary response 
logit model, profit and loss account variables are able to correctly classify 84.6% of 
the observations, although with a somewhat imbalance probability of successes: 87.1% 
of the organizations that received grants are correctly classified whilst this figure only 
reaches 61.4% for the other group. Fortunately, the imbalance goes in the right direction 
given that from the point of view of the supervisor the more substantive errors come 
from misclassifying an observation as 1 when it should be 0. What’s more, a great part 
of the misclassifications of aided entities (56%) could be catalogued as even as correct 
since 14 out of the 27 misclassifications in aided group are cases of years 2004 and 
2005. A significant portion of these misclassifications correspond to observations of 
entities that during the first years of the sample period had good financial health but 
whose posterior deterioration provoked their inclusion in the aided group.
The above outcomes are, however, somewhat biased. We are predicting the same cases 
that are being used to fit the model. A fairer assessment of the power of loss and profit 
accounts to correctly classify observations would demand employing different observa-
tions in the training and prediction steps. Hence, in the spirit of Hastie et al. (2009), the 
Table 3. Logit model predictions (full sample)¨
Type Predicted group membership¨ Total
0 1
Original Recount 0 183 27 210
1 51 81 132
% 0 87.1 12.9 100.0
1 38.6 61.4 100.0
Correctly classified 84.6% of cases
Notes: Calculations made using R version 2.15.2; ¨ The first matrix shows the cross-classification of 
actual group (rows) and predicted group (columns). The second matrix displays the relative marginal 
distributions by row; § As usual a case is predicted as 0 (1) if its estimate is minor (higher) than 0.5.
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sample has been repeatedly divided into two random subsamples of sizes 250 and 62 
and the approach has been assessed predicting the outcomes of the 62 observations of 
the second subsample using the model fitted with the larger subsample. After a hundred 
simulations of this strategy, we found that the level of successful classification between 
both groups was on average 79.45% (standard deviation, 4.92%), with this figure reach-
ing 81.05% (standard deviation, 5.68%) on aided entities.
5. Analysing differences by group
This section focuses on mean differences between groups carrying out a descriptive and 
inferential analysis. The variations by group of all the components that determined ROA 
are examined and evaluated in aggregate terms and on average across units. Fig. 1 pre-
sents the values of the variables, handling each group of entities as if they were unique 
corporations. The variables with asterisks are those for which the corresponding test of 
difference of means between groups was significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
The average ROA during the six year span studied is higher by more than 0.20% in the 
entities not needing public support than in those needing it. This finding is logical and 
Fig. 1. A comparison of profitability components by group
Notes: The statistics in the Figure has been obtained dealing with all the banks of each group as 
whether they were a sole entity. Aggregating loss and accounts figures of each group by years and 
entities and then computing rates; *, **, and *** denote variables for which the test of difference of 
means by groups was significant at level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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corroborates previous results: a high sustained series of ROA is a symptom of good 
health of an entity. Regarding ROA determinants, we find that institutions requiring 
public support registered on average higher figures on only two of the components 
identified as significant in regressions (OtResul and DetInvCre), whereas they scored 
lower figures for the rest of significant regression components. For the non-significant 
regression variables (Rcapit, Difcamb and OProv) non-intervened entities reach better 
statistics for none out of the three.
Comparing the group of variables non-significant in the regression with the group of 
variables for which non-significant differences of means exist between aided and un-
aided entities we find that only OProv is in both groups, although Rcapit shows sig-
nificant differences just at 10%. Despite the obvious differences that OtResult, OProv 
and ResExtr show in their numbers when each group of entities is handled as a unique 
corporation, these differences almost disappear when the averages are obtained across 
units. Indeed, from a statistical point of view, there are no differences between the 
averages of aided and unaided entities in Ropfin, OtResul, ResExtr and OProv. Regard-
less of the non-significant mean differences across units for these variables, it is worth 
analysing the variable Ropfin, because, although financial operations are considered a 
marginal and occasional source of generating value when the traditional ways fail, they 
have been significantly (and increasingly) used by Spanish firms in recent times. The 
purchase of own assets at a price lower than par (e.g., buying back preferred shares) 
has been a practice broadly employed during the last years for Spanish (savings) banks, 
and mainly among aided entities. Focusing now on the significant mean-difference and 
non-significant regression variables (Rcapit and Difcamb), we find that the difference 
detected for Rcapit could be considered a statistical artifice. A result caused by the 
unusual behaviour of only five firms. Conversely, the mean differences by group in 
Difcamb seem to be genuine. The roots for this are in the dissimilar running of banks 
and savings banks in this variable and in the asymmetric distribution of banks and sav-
ings banks between groups.
Among the mean-significant variables with a positive impact on ROA, the greatest dif-
ferences between groups are located in Comis, Rpart and Margin, while DetInvCre and 
EficienA are among the variables with a negative impact on ROA. All these variables are 
indeed the five variables that show the highest relative impacts on profitability (Table 2). 
The component with the greatest differential is Comis. Unaided institutions obtained as 
a whole 0.26% more income through commissions than aided entities. The above result 
moreover was reached after a process in which the gap between both groups widened. 
From 2004 to 2009, commissions on assets grew in the unaided group from 0.62% to 
0.84%, whilst they remained quite stable, in the range 0.46-0.52%, in the other group.
The spread between interest paid and collected on assets (Margin) presents the second 
largest gap. Margin was on the average 0.11% (as a whole, 0.01%) higher in non-aided 
entities, with a growing gap during the sample period. Average Margin in unaided insti-
tutions advanced from 1.44% in 2004 to 2.10% in 2009, when it evolved from 1.80% to 
1.58% in the aided group. Despite this, unaided institutions did not lose market share. 
The amount of the difference in Rpart depends on the statistic employed. Although 
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this variable shows the highest dissimilarity when differences are calculated on aver-
age across units and as a whole by group (0.15% versus 0.05%), it is clear that Rpart 
is higher in unaided institutions and that this fact has notably contributed to the better 
ROA figures within the unaided group.
Among the variables contributing negatively to ROA, we find that DetinvCre is as 
expected higher among aided entities. As a whole, non-aided entities dedicated 0.10% 
less resources to defend themselves from these deteriorations; a clear indicator of their 
healthier loan portfolio. Conversely, despite EficienA impacting negatively on ROA, 
the unaided entities registered on average larger figures during the sample period. As a 
whole, their expenses were 0.17% higher than those of aided entities. Nevertheless, the 
better performance of unaided entities in the rest of variables was enough to compensate 
their worse scores in this variable.
Conclusions
The restructuring of the Spanish financial system has been the most significant ever 
made and has definitely changed the Spanish financial map. This paper identifies, for 
the period immediately preceding the beginning of the restructuring, what components 
of profit and loss accounts have generated profitability and analyses the differences be-
tween the group of firms that have received public aid and the group that have not. Our 
analyses show that these components could be used to discriminate between entities. 
The study identifies some precursors or leading indicators that can help in the future 
to anticipate problems, making it easier to react to the financial supervisory authority.
The profitability of the entities that have not received public aid was for the period 
2004–2009 on average more than 50% higher than in those entities that have had public 
support. This better performance was grounded in the traditional revenue components 
that support financial institutions (such as margin on interest rates and commissions) 
as well as in revenues obtained from participated companies and extraordinary results. 
These results, moreover, were reached despite non-aided banks having worse figures in 
personnel and administrative expenses. It seems that in exchange for more personalised 
services customers are willing to pay higher commissions. Anyway, given the trend that 
this variable shows, it should be controlled in the future before becoming a matter of 
concern.
Panel data linear regression econometric analyses have enabled to identify the compo-
nents of profit and loss accounts generating profitability and also to detect that the im-
pact of all the variables has not been homogeneous by group. All the variables identified 
as significant in the econometric analyses appear with the expected sign. Net interest 
margin, revenues from investments, commissions, net financial operation results, other 
results, extraordinary revenues and taxes have a significant positive impact on profitabil-
ity; whereas staff and administration costs, provisions for depreciation and impairment 
of loans and amortizations impact negatively.
Further, a binary choice analysis has proved that there were significant differences in the 
configuration of determinants of ROA among aided and unaided entities. As a whole, 
more than 80% of the observations could be correctly predicted in a logit analysis, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 04
:37
 24
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
1183
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2015, 16(6): 1170–1184
growing these numbers to 87.1% among aided entities. Furthermore, through a predic-
tion exercise we have shown the potential predictive power that loss and profit accounts 
have to identify aided situations. We hope that the knowledge derived from this analysis 
could be used in the future by supervisor authorities in different countries to identify 
potential circumstances of risk and, in this way, try to avoid ending up with the enor-
mous solvency difficulties that have recently rocked the Spanish financial system or, at 
least, to reduce the magnitude of future challenges.
Nevertheless, given the structural differences in banking sector and financial regulation 
that still persists among countries in the Eurozone, our analyses should not be general-
ized without care to other EU countries. A detailed study of similarities and divergences 
with Spanish regulation and banking sector should be carried out before extrapolating 
our results to other country. 
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